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Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é explorar a noção de “crise” de Thomas Kuhn e indicar
algumas de suas dificuldades. Emprimeiro lugar, Kuhn define “crise” pormeio
da noção de “anomalia”, distinguindo esses conceitos de duas maneiras difer-
entes: categórica e quantitativamente. Ambas as alternativas, no entanto, se
mostram problemáticas. A definição categórica se baseia em uma distinção en-
tre “descobertas” e “invenções” que, como o próprio Kuhn admite, é bastante
artificial. A definição quantitativa, por sua vez, afirma que as crises são um tipo
de anomaliamais profundo. Kuhn, entretanto, não oferece nenhum critério que
permita definir demaneira objetiva essa “profundidade” das crises. O segundo
tipo de problema está relacionado à aplicação do conceito de “crise”. Aparente-
mente, Kuhn atribui crises a indivíduos tanto quanto a comunidades. Por fim,
há o problema da função das crises. Em The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
elas são apresentadas como uma pré-condição para as revoluções científicas.
Em artigos posteriores, no entanto, Kuhn parece vê-los apenas como um an-
tecedente comum das revoluções.
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Abstract
The aim of the article is to explore Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “scientific crisis”
and indicate some difficulties with it. First, Kuhn defines “crisis” through the
notion of “anomaly” but distinguishes these concepts in two different ways:
categorically and quantitatively. Both of these alternatives face considerable
problems. The categorical definition relies on a distinction between “discover-
ies” and “inventions” that, as Kuhn himself admits, is artificial. The quantita-
tive definition states that crises are a deeper, more profound type of anomaly.
Kuhn, however, does not offer any criteria for objectively defining this “sever-
ity” of the crises. The second kind of problem is related to the application of the
concept of “crisis.” Apparently, Kuhn attributes crises to individuals as much
as to communities. Lastly, there is the problem of the function of crises. In The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, they are presented as a precondition to scien-
tific revolutions. In later articles, however, Kuhn seems to see them only as a
common antecedent to revolutions.
Keywords: Thomas Kuhn, Crisis, Anomaly, Scientific Revolution, Philosophy
of Science.
1 Introduction
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR, 1962), Thomas Kuhn advances a
general model of how natural sciences develop over time. According to him,
scientific disciplines are born with the acquisition of a paradigm — a concrete
solution to a problem that guides the resolution of new puzzles.1 From that
point onward, science can only experience two kinds of changes: the cumula-
tive process of normal science, which aims to articulate andmake the paradigm
more precise, and scientific revolutions, the substitution of one paradigm for an-
other. Acquisition of a paradigm, normal science, crisis, extraordinary science,
scientific revolution, and normal science once more—these are the successive
(and recurrent) stages by which natural sciences historically develop.2
The purpose of this article is to present some difficulties in defining the con-
cept of “crisis,” which seems central to Kuhn’s scientific development model.3
I will first discuss the very notion of crisis. Kuhn defines it in SSR through
1Later, Kuhn changed that view. He began to consider that the different schoolswere also guided
by a kind of paradigm, although not one that “identifies challenging puzzles, supplies clues to their
solution, and guarantees that the truly clever practitioner will succeed” (KUHN, 1970b, p. 178).
2This is a rather schematic description of the model proposed by Kuhn in SSR. Furthermore,
his ideas on these themes changed considerably over time. He came to assume that the so-called
pre-paradigmatic schools possessed some kind of paradigm (see footnote 1 above) and that what
actually characterized the development of science was speciation rather than mutation (KUHN,
1991). I will discuss his different views on the idea of scientific crisis in section 5.
3How important it actually is is the subject of section 5.
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the idea of “anomaly.” Thus, the first section of the article will be devoted to
exploring that.
As discussed in the following section, Kuhn contrasts these concepts in two
different ways. In one, crises and anomalies are considered categorically differ-
ent; in the other, the difference is presented as a matter of degree. Both formu-
lations, however, have considerable problems. A qualitative difference between
anomaly and crisis ultimately depends on a real distinction between “discover-
ies” and “inventions,” something that Kuhn himself denies. On the other hand,
if we consider these concepts as differing only in degree, there is the problem
of finding a threshold to distinguish them.
A second kind of problem, which is the subject of section 4, stems from the
dubious nature of crises. On the one hand, they seem to be linked to scientists’
individual evaluations and their perception that the theory has failed seriously.
On the other hand, Kuhn also presents crises as if they were a diffuse symptom
in the scientific community.
The last problem concerns the role assigned to crises for the outbreak of
scientific revolutions. In SSR, crises are seen as fundamental to the weakening
of a dominant paradigm and therefore as contributing to the emergence of an
alternative. In Kuhn’s later writings, especially (KUHN, 1970b), crises seem to
become a dispensable mechanism for the transition between theories. This is
the subject of section 5.
The aimof this paper is, therefore, to identify three types of problems related
to Kuhn’s notion of crisis: ontological (what are scientific crises?), methodolog-
ical (who experiences crises?), and explanatory (what do crises do?).
2 Anomalies
In SSR, Kuhn defines the concept of crisis based on the notion of the anomaly.4
But, after all, what are anomalies? For that, it is necessary to discuss first what
Kuhn understands by “puzzles”.
According toKuhn, the acceptance of a paradigmby a community—whether
in the emergence of an initial tradition of normal science or after a scientific rev-
olution—depends on two essential elements. The first is that the achievements
4This does not imply assuming a logical precedence of the latter concept over the former. Both
concepts could be defined independently, and the comparison could operate in the opposite direc-
tion as well—defining anomalies through crises. However, Kuhn opted to explain anomalies first
rather than crises. For practicality, I will mirror the explanatory structure of his arguments. None
of the problems pointed out here depend on the reliance of one of these concepts on the other.
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of the paradigm be “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of
adherents” (KUHN, 1962, p. 10). This was, for instance, the case of Newtonian
optics, which, in establishing the corpuscular approach to the composition of
light, came to settle the first widely accepted theory in the field.
However, to consider the achievements of a paradigm as being superior to
that of its competitors does not mean to consider the paradigm as a finished
piece of knowledge. According to Kuhn, a good paradigm never solves all the
problems it faces. Here we have the second characteristic of the paradigms of
normal science pointed out by Kuhn: their achievements must be “sufficiently
open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practition-
ers to resolve” (KUHN, 1962, p. 11), therebymaintaining a tradition of scientific
research.
Almost by definition, then, paradigms leave a great number of problems
open, and it is the task of normal science to solve them. These problems, which
Kuhn names “puzzles,” have four main characteristics: i) they are part of a
research tradition; ii) the puzzle is, to a great extent, “the only problem that
the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake”
(KUHN, 1962, p. 37); iii) puzzles have a guaranteed solution— failure to solve
such problems is considered a failure of the scientist, not of the theory;5 and iv)
any solution to them must obey “rules that limit both the nature of acceptable
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained” (KUHN, 1962, p.
38). Kuhn also classifies the theoretical and empirical puzzles that scientists
deal with in normal science as being basically of three types: “determination of
significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and articulation of the theory”
(KUHN, 1962, p. 34).
Thus, scientists are busy trying to solve the unsolved problems or puzzles
in their respective fields. But what exactly does it mean to say that a problem
is not solved? That can, in fact, have a number of meanings. Kuhn does not
offer a typology of unsolved problems, but Laudan (1977) develops this issue
more deeply. Firstly, such a problem may be one for which there is absolutely
no solution. This was once the case with theories that assumed the existence
of an ether and required evidence of the existence of this substance (KUHN,
1962, p. 72ff). Alternatively, such a problem may be one for which existing
solutions are not seen as satisfactory or, more gravely, a problemwhose current
5Having a guaranteed solution means that the scientist believes the problem can be solved ac-
cording to the current paradigm. In other words, the scientist maintains expectations about its
solvability.
Enunciação – V. 4, N. 2 (2019) – ISSN 2526-110X
Paulo Pirozelli
Three problems with Kuhn’s concept of “crisis” 139
solutions conflict with the empirical evidence available. In short, a problem
may be said to be unsolved in three different cases: when there is no solution
for it, when the solution is considered to be wrong, or when the solution is far
from ideal. Scientists apply their energy and time to attempts to find acceptable
and adequate solutions to such problems.
It is possible now to understand what anomalies are. An anomaly is a spe-
cific type of unsolvedproblem. What distinguishes it fromother unsolvedprob-
lems is that it involves “the recognition that nature has somehow violated the
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science” (KUHN, 1962, p.
53). Thus, anomalies are unsolved problems that affect the expectations held
by scientists.6
What kind of expectations would be violated by anomalies? Kuhn presents
not one but at least three different types of expectations. The first relates to
“expectations about nature” (KUHN, 1962, 127) —what kinds of behavior one
can imagine the natural worldwill display, aswell aswhat types of objects exist.
It is, therefore, a belief about what one expects to find during investigations.
The second type of expectation that Kuhn refers to is the set of “instrumental
as well as theoretical expectations” (KUHN, 1962, p. 59) linked to a paradigm.
This secondmodality derives from the first: if the scientist believes that a certain
type of behavior will occur in nature, it is natural to imagine that certain types
of equipment and approaches will work accordingly.
There is yet a third type of expectation, which is linked to the capacity of
the paradigm to deal with the problems it faces. As discussed, normal science
never solves all the problems it faces; there are alwaysmany questions forwhich
scientists have no adequate solution. The nature of normal science, though, as-
sures them that existing problemswill be solved through the current paradigm.
In other words, the paradigm leads the scientist to expect that unsolved prob-
lems will be solved in the future.
If these are the expectations that underpin scientists’ research, it is easy to
understand the circumstances in which an anomaly is a violation of expecta-
tions. The first such violation, in which the first two types of expectations can
be grouped, is a confrontation with situations that the theory did not antici-
pate: an unforeseen phenomenon or a difficulty in the use of instrumentation
for which the “paradigm has not readied the investigator” (KUHN, 1962, p.
6One of the difficulties of finding a precise characterization of anomalies in SSR is that Kuhn uses
the term not only for problems that generate “violations of expectations" but also for violations of
expectations themselves (KUHN, 1962, p. xliii).
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57). This is a spectrum ranging from an extreme where the theory says nothing
about a particular situation to the case where a theory’s predictions are directly
contrary to the empirical evidence. The second type of expectation break is
that which results from frustration with the problems that the theory proved
surprisingly incapable of responding to.7
These two modalities of expectation breaks are ultimately related. Situa-
tions that conflict with what is expected of nature or of the instruments — the
first type of expectation break— force the scientist to pay attention to the source
of difficulty. The indirect effect of the theory’s failures is then to provoke a mis-
trust in scientists as to the theory’s ability to guide research— that is, a violation
of expectation in the second sense. The failure of the paradigm to deal with un-
expected situations draws the scientist’s attention to the difficulty, undermining
confidence in the paradigm’s ability to deal with unsolved problems. In a cer-
tain sense, it is the secondmeaning of “anomaly” that is the most fundamental.
3 Crisis and anomaly
Kuhndefines the concept of the crisis through the concept of the anomaly (KUHN,
1962, p. 66-7). But it is not so easy to understand how he does that. Indeed,
Kuhn contrasts anomalies and crises in two different ways.
His first characterization is qualitative. He states that crisis is to invention
(a novelty in the realm of theories) what anomaly is to discovery (a novelty in
the realm of phenomena) (KUHN, 1962, p. 67). However, as Kuhn himself ad-
mits, this analogy is fragile; the distinction between discovery and invention is,
he writes, “exceedingly artificial” (KUHN, 1962, p. 53; see also KUHN,1962, p.
7, 33). The very notion of discovery, as Kuhn carefully explains in chapter 6 of
SSR, involves the recognition not only that something exists but also the simul-
taneous recognition of the nature of this new element. In this sense, novelties in
the realm of phenomena also presuppose processes of conceptual assimilation.8
It becomes clear, therefore, how problematic Kuhn’s first attempt at defining a
crisis is.
Kuhn’s second characterization of crises through anomalies is quantitative.
7Hoyningen-Huene refers to these two cases as an “anomaly” and “anomalous problem,” re-
spectively (HOYNINGEN-HUENE, 1993, p. 224).
8“Scientific fact and theory are not categorically separable, except perhaps within a single tradi-
tion of normal-scientific practice. That is why the unexpected discovery is not simply factual in its
import and why the scientist’s world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched
by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory” (KUHN, 1962, p. 7).
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Their difference would be only of degree, a matter of greater or lesser inten-
sity. Kuhn, for instance, states that crises produce “a similar but more profound
awareness” (KUHN, 1962, p. 67) than anomalies. Broader changes of theories
would be motivated by events similar to anomalies but of much greater ampli-
tude — that is, crises.
This second definition, distinguishing anomalies and crises by their degree
of severity, seems more plausible, since Kuhn points out a series of similarities
between both notions. Their importance depends on the size of the violation
of expectations, they only make sense when put “against the background pro-
vided by the paradigm” (KUHN, 1962, p. 65), they vary according to the belief
in the future ability of the theory to deal with unsolved problems, and they are
generally events that scientists’ are conscious of, among other things.
The problem with this second definition comes when we try to pin down
the line that separates anomalies and crises. There is no clear criterion that
distinguishes a severe anomaly from a crisis. When is a break of expectations no
longer a mere anomaly but instead a crisis of the paradigm? How does one set
this threshold? If the establishment of a line is impossible, it is not obvious why
it is necessary to introduce two different concepts for one single phenomenon.
One possibilitywould be to consider that these are relatively vague concepts
which would nevertheless have some function, even though it is not possible to
precisely distinguish anomalies and crises nor to indicate where the passage
from one stage to another is. I will discuss this possibility in the conclusion.
Let us now examine another possibility. Why not consider that what differs
a crisis from a simple anomaly is its broad effect in the community, as opposed
to the restricted extent of anomalies? A crisiswould affect the community, while
an anomaly would be restricted to the individual. This leads to a second set of
questions about who is experiencing scientific crises.
4 Psychology and sociology
Thus, a second set of problems related to the concept of crisis relates to the agent
that experiences the related events. By definition, a crisis is an acute perception
that the paradigm is not performing properly. But who, after all, realizes that?
Is it the community or the individual who sees an unsolved problem as repre-
senting a direct attack on the paradigm?
It is interesting to consider herewhatKuhn states about the severity of anoma-
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lies and what makes some anomalies more relevant than others. He points out
some key factors, linked to the two types of expectation breaks previously dis-
cussed.
First, the severity of an anomaly varies according to the degree of radical-
ity with which scientists’ expectations about the nature are violated. In other
words, the strength of the anomaly depends on the difficulty it brings to the the-
ory — the anomaly, Kuhn asserts, is proportional to the “estimate of the extent
to which the phenomenon violated paradigm-induced anticipations” (KUHN,
1962, p. 56). Thus, an anomaly that calls into question explicit and fundamental
generalizations of the paradigm is very pressing. Furthermore, the magnitude
of an anomaly increases or decreases according to its resistance to the scientists’
attempts to resolve it.
All these elements, it should be noted, are fundamentally individual assess-
ments. Different scientists may have conflicting perspectives on the importance
they attach to an anomaly — both about the extent to which the problem vi-
olates theory and about how difficult it has been to find a solution (KUHN,
1977). These different evaluations may derive from their distinct research ac-
tivities, from social concerns (the practical importance of the problem), from
personal matters (the familiarity of the scientist with the problem and her field
of action), institutional matters (the prominence of the scientist in the area),
and so forth. To a lesser extent, these divergences represent the same variation
that exists between supporters of rival paradigms, who “disagree about the list
of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve” (KUHN, 1962, p.
147).
If this is true for the anomalies, it must also apply to the crises. After all, a
crisis is an extreme violation of expectations, and expectations vary fromperson
to person, depending on their different backgrounds. The debates between pro-
ponents of Copernican and Ptolemaic astronomy, described by Kuhn, demon-
strate well this aspect of crises. What Copernicus saw as an incorrigible failure
of Ptolemaic astronomy, followers of the latter saw as a normal puzzle, a tem-
porary gap in between observation and theory (for other examples, see KUHN,
1962, p. 54–58).
Therefore, a violation of expectations seems to be a violation of expectations
for a specific individual. The difference in judgment among scientists is actually
what explains how multiple paradigms coexist at certain times and how a new
paradigm “emerges first in themind of one or a few individuals” (KUHN, 1962,
p. 143; see also KUHN, 1962, p. 90). While some individuals maintain their
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belief in the traditional paradigm, others experience crises, feeling the need to
develop new approaches.
Nonetheless, the examples provided by Kuhn in SSR point simultaneously
to a sense of crisis in the community. He says, for example, that there was a
crisis in Ptolemaic astronomy before Copernicus, and a crisis in chemistry that
preceded Lavoisier (KUHN, 1962, chap. vii).
Thus, we can find two distinct concepts of crisis in SSR. On the one hand,
crisis is seen as the breakdown of an individual’s expectations, a logical or psy-
chological phenomenon. On the other hand, a crisis is also displayed as an
eminently sociological concept: a diffuse feeling in the community regarding
the inability of the paradigm to solve the most fundamental problems of the
field.
This difficulty is typical of the presentation found in SSR. Throughout the
book, there is a clear tension between individual-level and community-level
analyses — an error of which Kuhn concedes he has repeatedly been guilty.
He often conflates psychological and sociological concepts, treating “groups as
individuals writ large or else individuals as groups writ small” (KUHN, 1993,
p. 241; see also KUHN, 1989, p. 86–89).
But how do we reconcile these two levels of analysis? The answer lies in an
understanding of the highly homogeneous nature of scientific pedagogy. The
relative standardization of professional paths causes a great similarity between
scientists’ applications of paradigms, as well as their perceptions about theo-
ries’ merits. Scientists, therefore, tend to have fairly similar views on what the
most relevant problems in their fields are, what problems the theories should
have been able to solve and were not, and so forth — even if marginal differ-
encesmay have profound effects for the resolution of controversies (see KUHN,
1962, chap. xii). This is what makes it possible to generalize the effects of the
awareness of persistent anomalies to the whole community.
Returning to the question raised in the previous section — whether a cri-
sis might differ from an anomaly by its breadth — I conclude that it does not.
Both crises and anomalies are fundamentally individual events that, by virtue of
the similarity between scientists’ professional and educational trajectories, can
somehow be treated as generalizations about the communities. In this sense, at
least, there is no difference between anomalies and crises.
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5 The function of the crisis
A third problem regarding the notion of crisis pertains to its role within the
explanatory model proposed by Kuhn. Crises are a violation in expectations,
which arises from the fact that the solution for amajor problem shows itself to be
more difficult to handle than onemight expect. The immediate effect is to shake
scientists’ confidence in the paradigm. The difficulty of providing a response to
a problem that is supposedly solvable causes “pronounced professional insecu-
rity” — insecurity “generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of normal
science to come out as they should” (KUHN, 1962, p. 68).
During a period of normal science, a paradigm is seen as providing the out-
lines of legitimate problems and solutions. In times of crises, however, the af-
fected scientists no longer trust the paradigm as the basis of scientific research.
Instead, there is the “blurring of a paradigm and the consequent loosening of
the rules for normal research” (KUHN, 1962, p. 84). The outcome of the crisis
is hence
the proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try
anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to phi-
losophy and to debate over fundamentals (KUHN, 1962, p. 91).
Kuhn insists that if it were not for the crises, few scientists would ever be per-
suaded to abandon a successful paradigm for a candidate without any retro-
spect of success. For this to occur, it is necessary that “nature itself must first
undermine professional security by making prior achievements seem problem-
atic” (KUHN, 1962, p. 168).
Hence, in SSR, Kuhn argues that crises play a key role in theoretical change.
By undermining confidence in the current paradigm, crises allow the emer-
gence of new contenders. This may lead to a new paradigm taking the place
of the older one—what Kuhn calls a “scientific revolution.” For this reason, he
claims that crises are “prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory” (KUHN,
1962, p. 67). Just as the perception of an anomaly is fundamental to the discov-
ery of new types of phenomena, “the sense of malfunctioning that can lead to
a crisis” (KUHN, 1962, p. 93) in the paradigm is a prelude to major changes in
theory.
This, at least, is the function of crises in SSR. After the publication of the
book, in the face of innumerable criticisms, Kuhn made some important re-
marks on the notion of crisis in a series of texts (KUHN, 1970a; KUHN, 1970b).
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Two major aspects were emphasized in those texts.
The first point regards the elements that are responsible for provoking a cri-
sis. Previously, Kuhn had emphasized two factors: problems that the paradigm
had difficulty in solving and issues outside science that could increase the rel-
evance and urgency of certain problems. Now, he mentions a third possible
cause for crises within a specialty: results obtained in other areas. In some
degree, scientific disciplines are always in interaction. Because of that, new in-
struments or laws “may develop in one specialty and their assimilation create
crisis in another” (KUHN, 1962, p. 180).
What is most important for our discussion, however, is the second point ad-
dressed by Kuhn. According to him, although crises are a common component
preceding changes in theories, they are not strictly necessary for scientific rev-
olutions. Instead, they would be only a frequent element in the transition from
one paradigm to another. In his words,
Nothing important to my argument depends, however, on crises’
being an absolute prerequisite to revolutions; they only need to be
the usual prelude, supplying, that is, a self-correcting mechanism
which ensures that the rigidity of normal science will not forever go
unchallenged (KUHN, 1970b, p. 180; contrast that to KUHN, 1962,
p. 28, 67, 93).
Unfortunately, Kuhn does not discuss the role of crises much further. All that is
possible to know is thatKuhnno longer saw crises as an indispensable preamble
to scientific revolutions.
6 Conclusion
Throughout this article, I have analyzed three classes of problems that involve
Kuhn’s notion of crisis. The first concerned the nature of these episodes. Kuhn
defines crises through anomalies, but he does that in two distinct ways: quali-
tatively and quantitatively. In the first case, he says that anomalies precipitate
discoveries of new phenomena, as well as that crises trigger wider theoretical
changes. The difficulty with this analogy is that the distinction between discov-
eries and inventions is, as Kuhn himself admits, extremely artificial. The second
possibility, which considers anomalies and crises as differing only in degree, is
more promising, but lacks any further clarification. At what point, after all,
does an anomaly become a crisis?
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Another set of questions concerns those who suffer the effects of crises: are
they individual scientists or scientific communities? The notion of crisis seems
to make more sense when applied to individuals, since assessments of viola-
tion of expectations may vary from person to person. However, there is a sense
in which crises can be seen as hitting entire communities or at least groups of
scientists. Since scientists undergo fairly similar and homogeneous profession-
alization processes, it is natural that they evaluate theories in a very similar
way. For this reason, a violation of expectation for an individual is also often a
violation of expectation for the rest of the community.
Finally, I discussed two different conceptions of the role of crises. At first,
in SSR, crises were seen as being a prerequisite for changes of theory. In his
later writings, however, Kuhn softens this demand, saying that they are not a
necessary antecedent to revolutions but only a frequent one. However, he does
not develop this reformulated view.
In discussing the problems pointed out here, I do not intend to suggest that
the concept of “crisis” is of little or nouse forKuhn’s enterprise. On the contrary,
this notion plays an important role in his explanatory model. The notion of
crisis is particularly useful for his historical descriptions, since they allow him
to emphasize, albeit in a very generalway, the psychological factors in theminds
of the scientists that facilitate the acceptance of a new paradigm. However, as
an epistemological concept, crisis seems to be rather fragile. I have tried to show
some of the problems with it and how they could be overcome.
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